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"Taxation is a game which must be played strictly
in accordance with the rules."
1
N Texas, as in other taxing jurisdictions, the rules are changing and
the "game" is getting more expensive, as states seek to solve budget-
ary challenges by extending the reach of their taxing jurisdiction. The
past year witnessed numerous administrative and judicial challenges to
Texas' authority to define more accurately the scope of services taxes, to
extend the scope of "nexus," and to subject in-transit goods to property
tax.2 Franchise tax planning continued to attract significant attention
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University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
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1. Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305. 306 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 820 (1962).
2. Cases, regulations and other developments that fell within this Survey period but
were included in last year's Survey article are not included in this article. See Cynthia M.
Ohlenforst, Jeff W. Dorrill & Kathryn A. Christmann, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1649 (1994) [hereinafter, 1994 Tax Survey].
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from both taxpayers and the state, as taxpayers continued the struggle to
minimize the impact of Texas' version of a corporate income tax.
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
During the Survey period, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
several Commerce Clause challenges to state tax laws as taxpayers con-
tinued to assert constitutional violations resulting from the application
and enforcement of various state taxes. In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Dept. of Environmental Quality3 operators of solid waste disposal facili-
ties successfully challenged the constitutionality of Oregon's imposition
of a surcharge on the disposal of solid waste generated in other states that
was almost three times higher than the fee imposed on the disposal of
waste generated within Oregon. The Court held that the surcharge was
facially invalid under the negative Commerce Clause4 and could not be
sustained as a compensatory tax,5 or as resource protectionism designed
to conserve space in landfills for waste generated in Oregon.6
In Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman7 the Supreme Court
held that Missouri's use tax scheme, under which the use tax did not cor-
respond to a sales tax at the state level, was impermissibly discriminatory
in violation of the Commerce Clause8 in localities in which the use tax
exceeded the local sales tax.9 Missouri imposes a statewide sales tax on
sales of goods within the state and an equivalent statewide use tax on
goods brought into the state subsequent to an out-of-state purchase. The
challenged tax was an additional use tax of one and a half percent im-
posed on the privilege of storing, using, or consuming within the state any
article of personal property purchased outside the state. 10 Though by its
terms the additional use tax appeared to violate the Commerce Clause
3. 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
4. Id. at 1355. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although the Commerce Clause is
stated as a grant of authority to Congress to regulate commerce among the states, it is well
established that the Commerce Clause has a negative aspect that denies the states the right
to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce. See, e.g.,
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992); New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
5. Under the compensatory tax doctrine, the negative Commerce Clause is not vio-
lated if a tax, though facially discriminatory, imposes the equivalent of an identifiable and
substantially similar tax on interstate commerce as that imposed on intrastate commerce.
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 758-59 (1981).
6. Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1353-55. In a factually analogous case, the
Supreme Court held that Alabama was prohibited by the negative Commerce Clause from
imposing a higher fee on the disposal of hazardous waste from other states than on the
disposal of identical waste from Alabama. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112
S. Ct. 2009, 2012-14 (1992). However, the Court left open the possibility that such a
surcharge might be valid if based on the cost of disposing of waste from other states. Id. at
2016, n.9.
7. 114 S. Ct. 1815 (1994).
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. Associated Indus., 114 S. Ct. at 1821-23.
10. Mo. REV. STAT. § 144.748 (Supp. 1993).
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prohibition against discrimination, the state argued that the tax was valid
as a compensatory tax." Stating that the standard which must be met is a
strict rule of equality, the Court held that under Missouri's use tax
scheme, the discrepancy in those jurisdictions where the use tax exceeded
the sales tax imposed a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce, 12
because for a tax system to be compensatory the burdens on interstate
and intrastate commerce must be equal. 13
Many of the cases and administrative decisions decided during the Sur-
vey period continued to interpret and define taxable services. The court
of appeals addressed the telecommunications tax' 4 in Teleprofits of Texas,
Inc. v. Sharp.'5 Teleprofits, a regulated provider of telecommunications
services, provided coin-operated telephone services. Teleprofits obtained
access to a telephone network by purchasing customer-owned and coin-
operated telephone lines through the local exchange company.
Teleprofits then sold to individuals access to the telephone network from
pay phones for charging twenty-five cents per local call.
Teleprofits brought suit claiming an exemption from sales tax under
section 151.323(2) of the Tax Code, 16 which exempts from sales tax the
receipts from the sale, use, or other consumption of access to a local ex-
change telephone company's network by a regulated provider of telecom-
munications services. Teleprofits argued that since it is a regulated
provider, the exemption should apply to all of its business transactions,
thus providing a tax exemption both when Teleprofits bought access to a
local network and when it sold that access to its customers. In denying
the exemption, the court held that the exemption applies to Teleprofits'
original purchase of access to a local network but does not exempt the
subsequent sale of such access by Teleprofits to its customers. 17 After
engaging in a statutory construction analysis' 8 of the exemption, the court
11. See supra note 4. See also Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1352.
12. Associated Indus., 114 S. Ct. at 1821.
13. Id. "[E]qual treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is
the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state." Halli-
burton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963). See Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583-84 (1937).
14. The telecommunications tax was also addressed by the district court in Confiden-
tial Communications Corp. v. Sharp, No. 9201571 (167th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.,
May 9, 1994) (holding that the provider of airtime for mobile phone and radio communica-
tions did not qualify for exemption under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.323(2) or
151.323(3) (Vernon 1992)). See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,273 (Feb. 28,
1994) (finding telegram and telegraph services are taxable telecommunications services);
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,930 (June 15, 1993) (holding facsimile services are
taxable telecommunications services).
15. 875 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
16. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.323(2) (Vernon 1992).
17. Teleprofits, 875 S.W.2d at 750.
18. The court determined the statutory exemption was ambiguous in that the comp-
troller understood the exemption to apply only to the original sale of access to a regulated
provider and Teleprofits understood the exemption to apply to all subsequent sales of ac-
cess by a regulated provider; therefore, the court had to look to the standard rules of
statutory construction to determine the meaning of the exemption. Id. at 750-751.
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ultimately held the statute applies only when the local exchange carrier
provides access to the regulated provider (Teleprofits in this case). 19
In Reuters Information Services, Inc. v. Sharp20 the Austin Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the sales tax as it applies to elec-
tronic information services, even though newspapers are specifically ex-
empt from the sales tax. Reuters provided electronic news services to
subscribers through satellite or telephone lines. The state argued that
Reuters was providing taxable information services21 to its customers,
and despite Reuters' argument that the tax provisions are facially invalid
because they are content based, the state maintained that the sole basis
for the application of the tax to Reuters rested upon the format require-
ments of the newspaper exemption.22
Reuters objected to the imposed tax on a variety of grounds. Reuters
claimed that the tax violated its constitutional rights, including the free
speech provisions and equal protection clauses of both the federal and
state constitutions.23 Additionally, Reuters argued that treating its news
information services differently from print newspapers resulted in an un-
justifiable tax on the press; Reuters argued it was an electronic newspa-
per and therefore part of the newspaper medium. The state responded
that Reuters could not qualify for the newspaper exemption because the
exemption rested upon the basis of how the message was conveyed, refer-
ring to the format distinctions with respect to price, newsprint, and fre-
quency of distribution, rather than on the content of the message. The
court agreed with the state, concluding that the service provided by
Reuters, similar to the cable industry, presents information through a me-
dium different from the print media.24 The court concluded that the tax
provisions were constitutional for three reasons: the tax was based on
format requirements, not on the content of the speech; the tax was a gen-
erally applicable sales tax which did not single out the press or a small
group thereof; and the newspaper exemption was rationally related to
promoting literacy and administrative economy. 25
19. Id. at 752.
20. No. 3-93-124-CV (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 7, 1994, n.w.h.) (slip op.).
21. The Tax Code defined "information service" as: (1) furnishing general or special-
ized news or other current information, including financial information, unless furnished to
a newspaper of general circulation published at least as frequently as weekly or to a radio
or television station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission; or (2) elec-
tronic data retrieval or research. Act of July 21, 1987, 70th Leg. 2d C.S., ch. 5, § 5, 1987
Tex. Gen. Laws 9, 11, amended by Act of May 15, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 705, § 10, 1991
Tex. Gen. Laws 2521 (amended 1991) (current version at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0038
(Vernon 1992)).
22. Act of May 19, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 840, § 4, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4769, 4770,
amended by Act of May 15, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 705, § 16, 1991 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2520,
2523 (current version at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.319(f)(Vernon 1992)).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 8.
24. Reuters, No. 3-93-124-CV, slip. op. at 8-9. The United States Supreme Court has
ruled that a sales tax on cable television services and on cable satellite services, while ex-
empting the print media, does not violate the First Amendment. Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S. 439 (1991).
25. Reuters, No. 3-93-124-CV, slip op. at 18-19.
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Direct Resources for Print, Inc. v. Sharp26 addressed the issue of
whether the portion of a direct mail business which involved the printing
of mailing addresses on envelopes by means of an ink jet machine was a
taxable service pursuant to section 151.005(4) of the Tax Code,27 pertain-
ing to printing or imprinting of tangible personal property, or pursuant to
section 151.0101(a)(12), 28 pertaining to data processing services. The
comptroller argued both that the portion of the business which used the
ink jet machine was a taxable printing or imprinting service and that such
activity was a taxable data processing service, since the ink jet machine
used computer components which allowed the machine to read addresses
off magnetic tape and apply the addresses to envelopes. Direct Re-
sources asserted that the addressing of envelopes was not a taxable activ-
ity and that the "essence of the transaction" 29 was providing a non-
taxable direct-mail service. Direct Resources also argued that its activi-
ties with respect to the addressing of envelopes by ink-jet machines did
not meet the definition of printing, imprinting, or data processing. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Direct Resources
and the comptroller has filed an appeal.
30
Comptroller Hearing No. 29,507, 31 holding that guided birdwatching
trips are non-taxable, provided clarification of the exclusion from the def-
inition of amusement services for "the provision of educational or health
services if prescribed by a licensed practitioner of the healing arts for the
primary purpose of educational or health maintenance or improve-
ment."32 The tax division argued that the exemption language requires a
person to obtain a doctor's prescription in order to engage in educational,
primarily instructional activities. The administrative law judge disagreed
with the tax division's reading of the exemption and held that pursuant to
26. No. 93-00796 (353d Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., July 10, 1994), appeal filed.
27. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005(4) (Vernon 1992).
28. Id § 151.0101(a)(12) (Vernon 1992).
29. Before services became subject to tax, taxpayers could avoid taxation by showing
that the "essence of the transaction" was the transfer of a non-taxable service rather than
the transfer of tangible personal property. See Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549
S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977). Under this test, "[i]f the object or essence of the sale is not tangi-
ble personal property, but instead concerns intangible property, such as a service, then the
transaction is not taxable under any definition of sale." Comptroller v. Austin Multiple
Listing Serv., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ). See also First
Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
30. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,134 (June 2, 1994), which held
that the service of batching and paying freight bills was generally an accounts payable
service achieved through the use of a computer and therefore was a taxable business ac-
counting type of data processing.
31. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,507 (Feb. 9, 1994). Although guided
birdwatching services may not be of widespread interest, the decision is noteworthy for its
construction of a services tax.
32. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0028 (Vernon 1992).
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Rule 3.298(a)(2), 33 the services provided by taxpayer were not subject to
tax because they were primarily instructional in nature. 34
The interpretation of the distinction between taxable remodeling and
non-taxable new construction was the focus of several administrative de-
cisions during the Survey period. Decision 31,90435 involved press pits
which were constructed by excavating fifteen feet below floor level and
creating a room ten feet below ground level. Based upon the definition
of new construction in Rule 3.357,36 which specifically includes the addi-
tion of new footage to an existing structure, the comptroller held that
only new footage, not necessarily new floor footage, 37 is required and
therefore the addition was non-taxable new construction. 38 In Decision
29,26839 the comptroller allowed the taxpayer to use a bid proposal to
prove non-taxable costs related to a lump-sum contract which involved
both new construction and remodeling. The services involved construct-
ing a new building beside an existing building and demolishing the wall
between the two buildings to create one large building. The contract ref-
erenced a lump-sum price but also incorporated the bid proposal, which
did not allocate costs between new construction and remodeling but sepa-
rately stated a variety of charges. The comptroller held that the charges
in the bid proposal that strictly related to the construction of the new
building were not subject to tax, and those charges not sufficiently attrib-
utable to either new construction or remodeling were treated as taxable
remodeling. 40
Decision 30,39441 addressed the definition of real property services in
connection with a taxpayer whose business included the demolition of
buildings and the collection and removal of the demolished remains. The
taxpayer's customers were billed one tax-free lump-sum amount covering
33. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.298(a)(2) (West 1994).
34. The taxpayer's business was organizing, promoting and conducting trips for the
observation and identification of different birds. The decision noted that the guide services
conducted by taxpayer were primarily instructional and the participants in the trips in-
cluded educators and serious students of ornithology.
35. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,904 (May 12, 1994).
36. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357(a)(4) (West 1994).
37. The tax division interpreted the definition of new construction to require addi-
tional floor footage be created and argued that the construction at issue did not meet the
definition of new construction because it did not add new floor space to the building, the
building's total square footage remained the same. The administrative law judge rejected
the tax division's restrictive reading of the exemption and concluded that "the Tax Divi-
sion's interpretation of Rule 3.357 misreads the Rule's plain language". Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,904 (May 12, 1994).
38. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,296 (Dec. 20, 1993)(holding that
the initial underground installation of a large scale for weighing rail cars created new foot-
age, so the labor to install the scale was not taxable; also finding that the replacement of
old equipment with new equipment was taxable remodeling and did not qualify as new
construction); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,086 (July 18, 1994) (holding the
construction and installation of a 20,000 gallon tank was new construction on the basis that
the tank was an improvement to realty).
39. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,268 (Jan. 7, 1994).
40. Id.
41. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,394 (Sept. 21, 1994).
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the demolition and the removal of the demolished materials. The tax-
payer argued that its removal service was not a taxable real property ser-
vice,42 because the plain and common meaning of the term garbage does
not include the remnants from demolition. The comptroller disagreed
with the taxpayer and held that demolished construction materials col-
lected and removed clearly fall within the meaning of the term "rubbish."
The taxpayer's services were held taxable pursuant to Rule 3.356(i)(2),43
which provides that where non-taxable and taxable services are sold for
one lump-sum price, and the portion relating to taxable services repre-
sents more than five percent of total charge, the total charge is taxable.44
The decision also addressed the application of the essence of the transac-
tion doctrine to a transaction which involves only services. The comptrol-
ler held that even if the essence of the transaction test were applicable,
the taxpayer was hired to perform two services, one taxable and one non-
taxable, and the test is therefore of no avail.4 5
The exemption for sales to governmental entities was addressed in De-
cision 28,475,6 which involved the sale of office furniture and supplies to
a construction manager under contract with the Department of Energy
(DOE). In holding that the sale was not an exempt sale to the govern-
ment, the decision focused on the following facts: the contractor had a
cost-plus contract to furnish all materials and supplies necessary to per-
form the job; title to all materials and supplies passed directly from the
seller to the DOE; the contractor contracted with the seller in its own
name and was prohibited from binding the DOE; and the DOE was obli-
gated to reimburse the contractor. for the items purchased but was not
bound by the contractor's purchase contracts.4 7 The administrative law
judge noted that if a taxpayer-purchaser made purchases for resale to the
government and failed to issue a resale certificate, an exemption could
still be claimed upon demonstration that the purchase was for purpose of
resale.48 However, as in this case, a taxpayer-seller has a duty to collect
42. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0048 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995) defines real prop-
erty service to include the removal or collection of garbage, rubbish, or other solid waste,
with the exclusion of certain enumerated exceptions relating to hazardous waste or sewage.
43. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356 (i)(2) (West 1994).
44. Id. The taxpayer made an interesting argument that since the demolition services
are not statutorily subject to tax, but were held taxable under Rule 3.356(i), the rule im-
properly taxes services outside the statutory authority and should therefore be invalid and
unconstitutional on the basis that the comptroller does not have the power to expand the
reach of the statute to tax services not established by the legislature to be subject to tax.
The administrative law judge concluded that the rule is based on a grant of legislative
power and is a reasonable and legitimate exercise of the comptroller's authority. Tex.
Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,394 (Sept. 21, 1994).
45. id See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,247 (Oct. 4, 1994) (holding
that asbestos removal services are taxable as real property repair and remodeling).
46. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,475 (Feb. 10, 1994).
47. Though not argued by either party, the administrative law judge addressed
whether title could have passed from the seller to the contractor and then from the con-
tractor to the DOE. The administrative law judge concluded that even if title had passed
in such a manner, the sale to the contractor would not have been exempt because of the




and remit tax and must receive a properly completed resale certificate to
avoid liability.49
Decision 29,34550 focused on software maintenance services performed
on custom computer software, which were sold by the taxpayer to one of
its affiliates. Section 151.346(c) of the Tax Code5' allows an exemption
from tax services to certain affiliates, provided such services were not tax-
able prior to September 1, 1987.52 The administrative law judge correctly
concluded that maintenance services on custom computer programs is a
service that was not taxable on or prior to September 1, 1987,53 and that
such services therefore may qualify for exemption.54
Following the 1992 United States Supreme Court decision in Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota,55 out-of-state taxpayers continue to struggle to
49. The district court was presented with a challenge to the constitutionality of the
exemption for sales to governmental entities in Contract Trucking and Materials, Co. v.
Sharp, No. 91-14164 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Apr. 22, 1993). Prior to 1984, the
Tax Code exempted from sales and use tax tangible personal property purchased by a
contractor for the improvement to realty owned by a government entity, which then in-
cluded all levels of government (federal, state, county, city, etc.). TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.311, Act of June 10, 1981, 67th Leg., ch. 389, § 1, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 1490, 1561,
amended by Act of July 13, 1984, 68th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 31, art. 12, § 1, 1984 Tex. Gen.
Laws 228; Act of Apr. 3, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 69, at 2, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 473;
Act of Aug. 6, 1991, 72d Leg., 1st C.S., ch.5, art. 14, § 14.07, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 188; Act
of May 12, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 831, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3287-88 (current version
at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon Supp. 1995)). In 1984, § 151.311 was amended
to exclude the United States government from the exemption. Id. § 151.311. Act of July
13, 1984, 68th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 31, art. 12, § 1, 1984 Tex. Gen. Laws 193,228, amended by
Act of Apr. 3, 1984, 69th Leg. R.S., ch. 69, art. 2 § 11985 Tex. Gen. Laws 473; Act of Aug.
6, 1991, 72d Leg., 1st C.S., ch.5, art. 14, § 14.07 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 188; Act of May 12,
1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 831, § 11993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3287-88 (current version at TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon Supp. 1995)). Contract Trucking brought suit claiming that
subsequent to the 1984 amendment, § 151.3 11, together with 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291
(West 1994), was unconstitutional in that it: (1) attempts to assess a tax directly against the
United States government; (2) attempts to discriminate against the United States govern-
ment and the parties with whom it deals; and (3) attempts to asses a tax that is barred by
the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Contract Trucking, a contractor who did
work for the federal government, argued that if it purchased the identical equipment and
performed the identical work for use upon a project belonging to the state of Texas, it
would not be taxed. An Agreed Judgment was filed which ordered a refund to Contract
Trucking of the total amount in controversy. In light of the settlement, the court did not
have the opportunity to rule of the constitutionality of the statute.
50. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,345 (Feb. 17, 1994).
51. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.346(c) (Vernon 1992).
52. E.g., data processing services and information services.
53. Id. The taxpayer argued successfully that maintenance of custom computer pro-
grams was not taxable prior to September 1, 1987 since the Tax Code definition of "tangi-
ble personal property" excluded custom computer programs until October 1987. In other
words, prior to the relevant date, custom computer software was not considered tangible
personal property; therefore, maintenance of the custom computer software was not a tax-
able service. See Act of July 13, 1984, 68th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 31, art. 6, § 2, 1984 Tex. Gen.
Laws 222 (amended 1987) (current version at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.009 (Vernon
1992)).
54. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,193 (Nov. 22, 1993) (holding part-
nership not entitled to exemption as affiliated entity under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.346
(Vernon 1992) on basis that partnership did not file consolidated return).
55. 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912-13 (1992). In Quill, the United States Supreme Court held
that a North Dakota use tax requiring certain out-of-state vendors to collect the state's use
tax violated the Commerce Clause. Id.
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understand when "nexus" is established for Texas sales and use tax pur-
poses. Decision 30,66156 involved a Louisiana mail-order company which
did not have sales representatives, agents, or employees residing in Texas,
did not service or repair any of its products in Texas, and did not publicly
advertise in Texas. The corporation sent employees to participate in at
least two trade shows in Texas to exhibit the corporation's products. The
decision held that sufficient nexus was established by sending representa-
tives to Texas trade shows to market merchandise and generate Texas
sales,57 and therefore the corporation was required to collect Texas use
tax.58
Several administrative decisions addressed the issue of when a taxable
sale has occurred. Decision 30,27359 upheld the comptroller's informal
rule that a sale of cellular phones for less than twenty-five percent of the
dealer's cost is not a sale for sales tax purposes; therefore, the dealer's
purchase, according to this decision, does not qualify as an exempt sale
for resale. Decision 30,30360 involved a corporation that sold industrial
machines, some of which were set up in a showroom in order to demon-
strate the machines to potential customers. For financial accounting and
federal income tax purposes, the corporation depreciated the showroom
machines.61 All of the showroom machines were sold at full price with no
discount, and upon sale the corporation recaptured the depreciation it
had previously taken for federal tax purposes. The tax division argued
that depreciation of the showroom machines for federal income tax pur-
poses subjects the machines to tax, unless applicable returns are amended
to reverse the depreciation. The comptroller held that sales tax was not
applicable because the machines were sold for full list price and the de-
preciation previously taken was recaptured for tax purposes, resulting in
the functional equivalent to an amendment of the corporation's returns. 62
However, in Decision 31,350,63 the comptroller held that when returns
were not amended to reverse depreciation deductions, the depreciation
of an asset for tax purposes constituted a taxable "use" and sales tax was
due on the original purchase. 64
56. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,661 (May 17, 1994).
57. Id The corporation argued that its representatives that visit Texas are not sales-
men and are not sent to Texas to take orders; however, the administrative law judge found
such distinction without merit. Id
58. Id. In another decision addressing nexus, the comptroller held that independent
contractor distributors located in Texas that sell or take orders for products of an out-of-
state corporation imposed sufficient presence to establish nexus for use tax collection pur-
poses. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,495 (May 5, 1994).
59. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,273 (Feb. 28, 1994).
60. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,303 (Apr. 20, 1994).
61. The corporation's parent company was a foreign corporation whose applicable tax
law allows demonstration inventory items to be depreciated.
62. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,303 (Apr. 20, 1994).




In Decision 30,15165 the comptroller was faced with a situation not pre-
viously addressed. The taxpayer performed testing services for a corpora-
tion. The corporation leased to the taxpayer testing equipment used to
perform some of the tests on the corporation's products; however, the
lease agreement was silent as to consideration. Generally, the taxpayer
charged the corporation a discounted price for tests performed using the
equipment from the corporation. The taxpayer took the position that
sales tax was not applicable to the transfer of the equipment from the
corporation to the taxpayer because there was no payment and no consid-
eration in connection with the transfer. The comptroller, however, con-
cluded that a taxable sale occurred, that sales tax was applicable to the
consideration for the sale, and that the consideration should be measured
by the differential favoring use of the corporation's equipment (i.e., the
savings experienced by the corporation and the loss suffered by the
taxpayer).66
Decision 30,98467 upheld the comptroller's recent change of policy re-
garding the prior contract rule68 and found that the prior contract exemp-
tion applies only to third-party contracts. 69 The decision acknowledged
that the comptroller had adopted Rule 3.319,70 which extended the prior
contract exemption to two-party contracts. Further, the comptroller's
policy had been to allow two-party contracts to qualify for the exemption.
However, in 1992 the comptroller instituted a policy change and, as a
result, only third-party contracts could qualify for exemption as a prior
contract. The taxpayer argued that Rule 3.31971 should be afforded the
full force and effect of legislation and that the comptroller cannot simply
change his mind. The administrative law judge held that the comptrol-
ler's rule cannot be accorded any weight and does not have the full force
and effect of legislation because the comptroller was without authority to
adopt a rule that was contrary to the laws of the state.72 According to the
65. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,151 (Dec. 30, 1993).
66. Id.
67. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,984 (Aug. 12, 1994).
68. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319 (West 1994). The administrative law judge ac-
knowledged that the comptroller effected such change in policy in 1992 by denying all
pending refund claims and stating the reversal of existing policy through a tax policy news-
letter distributed to taxpayers. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,984 (Aug. 12,
1994).
69. Accord Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 31,232, 31,233 (Nov. 30, 1994); Tex.
Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 31,278, 31,279 (Nov. 7, 1994); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 31,275 (Nov. 2, 1994); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,576 (Nov. 2,
1994).
70. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319(b) (West 1994). In adopting an amendment to Rule
3.319(b), the comptroller specifically stated in the preamble that such amendment was
made to clarify the application of the rule to two-party contracts. See 13 Tex. Reg. 1340
(1988) (prop. amend, to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319).
71. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319 (West 1994).
72. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,984 (Aug. 12, 1994). This decision is
based upon Calvert v. British-American Oil Producing Co., 397 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1965),
which interpreted some earlier prior contract statutory exemption as applying to third-
party contracts only. The comptroller agrees, however, that the three-party contract re-
quirement does not apply to services that first became taxable in 1987.
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decision, the fact that Rule 3.319(b) 73 has yet to be formally amended has
no bearing on the fact that such portion of the rule is void and unenforce-
able because of the conflict with the Texas Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the prior contract rule. 74
Decision 30,76875 held that resale certificates which did not contain de-
scriptions of the taxable items generally sold by the purchasers were not
accepted by the seller in good faith and the sales were thus taxable. In
Decision 29,69276 the taxpayer accepted a properly completed resale cer-
tificate from a related company with respect to items the tax division
claimed were not purchased for resale. The tax division argued that the
taxpayer could not accept a resale certificate in good faith from a related
company because the taxpayer is charged with knowledge as to the use of
the purchased items by the related company. 77 The administrative law
judge found the resale certificate sufficient and held that the tax division
failed to prove that the taxpayer knew of any divergent or improper
use.78 The decision also noted that if tax resulted from a divergent use,
the liability for such tax would be on the buyer.79
Numerous procedural issues applicable to sales and use taxes were de-
cided by the courts as well as at the administrative level. These issues
included burden of proof with respect to taxable services, successor liabil-
ity, refund sampling and prepayment as a prerequisite to judicial
review.80
The comptroller, working with representatives of the broadcast indus-
try to formulate guidelines, also confirmed, informally, that broadcasters
who produce television and radio programs for consideration qualify for
the manufacturing exemption 81 for purchases of materials necessary, es-
sential to, and used directly in the production of the programs, and for
machinery, equipment, and accessories used directly in the production of
the programs. The exemption is also applicable to rented or leased ma-
chinery and equipment used in the production.82
73. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319(b) (West 1994).
74. See British-American, 397 S.W.2d at 839. Since at least one prior contract case has
already been filed at the courthouse, taxpayers will have another opportunity to point out
the comptroller's inconsistent view on this issue and to argue that this inconsistency results
in treating similarly situated taxpayers differently.
75. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,137 (Jan. 24, 1994).




80. Discussed infra at notes 203-48 and accompanying text.





The comptroller proposed revisions to Rule 3.31983 in 199384 to reflect
the policy change that the prior contract exemption would only be appli-
cable to third-party contracts; however, those revisions lapsed without be-
ing adopted. Therefore, during the Survey period, the rule continued to
contain language previously held to be applicable to two-party
contracts.85
To bring the rules into conformity with the 1993 amendments to the
Tax Code adopted by the Seventy-Third Legislature, the comptroller
amended several rules during the Survey period.86 Rule 3.316,87 which
sets forth the criteria for a qualifying sale of a business or an identifiable
segment of a business, was revised to refer specifically to tangible per-
sonal property in the definition of operating assets.88 To conform the rule
to the 1993 amendment to section 151.304 of the Tax Code,8 9 subsection
(i) was added to specifically require a purchaser who holds a tax permit to
accrue and remit tax on a transaction in which the seller qualifies for an
occasional sale exemption. 90 Rule 3.32991 was also amended to reflect
changes to section 151.429 of the Tax Code, 92 which allows a sales tax
refund for jobs retained, as well as jobs created, by an enterprise
project.93
The comptroller has amended various rules to conform with the addi-
tion of section 151.350 of the Tax Code 94 during the 1993 legislative ses-
sion, in which the legislature adopted an exemption for labor used to
repair tangible personal property damaged within a disaster area. Rules
3.29295 and 3.31096 were amended to exempt labor used to repair tangible
personal property in a disaster area if the amount of the charge for labor
is separately itemized, and the repair is to property damaged within a
disaster area by the condition that caused the area to be declared a disas-
83. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319 (prop. Aug. 31, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 5831).
84. For a discussion of the 1993 proposed revision to Rule 3.319, see 1994 Tax Survey,
at 1657-59.
85. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319(b) (West 1994).
86. For a discussion of the significant 1993 legislative changes affecting Texas sales tax,
see 1994 Tax Survey, at 1654-57. In addition, many of the amendments that became effec-
tive during the Survey period were adopted without changes from the proposed form dis-
cussed supra note 74.
87. 19 Tex. Reg. 2959 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(d)(3)).
88. Prior to the 1994 revision, the definition of operating assets did not include the
reference to tangible personal property, although former Rule 3.316(d)(4) made clear that
intangibles and real property were excluded from the definition. See 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.316(d)(4) (West 1994).
89. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
90. 19 Tex. Reg. 2959 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(i)).
91. 19 Tex. Reg. 633 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.329(b)).
92. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.429(b) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
93. Id
94. Id. § 151.350 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
95. 19 Tex. Reg. 632 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.292(h)).
96. 19 Tex. Reg. 633 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.310(h)).
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ter area. The exemptions do not apply to tangible personal property
transferred as part of the repair.97
The comptroller proposed revisions to Rules 3.330, 3.333, 3.342, 3.343,
3.354, 3.355, 3.356 and 3.357,98 concerning data processing services, secur-
ity services, information services, credit reporting services, debt collection
services, insurance services, real property services, and labor relating to
nonresidential real property repair, remodeling, restoration, new con-
struction, and residential property. The revisions modify the existing five
percent rule99 and allow for the separation of non-taxable charges for
unrelated services subsequent to the execution of a contract that includes
taxable services. The service provider will be able to establish, after the
transaction occurs, the percentage of the total charge that relates to non-
taxable unrelated services and tax will be due only on the portion of the
charge that relates to taxable services.' 00 Most importantly, the proposed
rules state these revisions will be applied retroactively. 1 1
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. LIABILITY FOR TAX - DOING BUSINESS IN TEXAS
Four years after the enactment of legislation that effectively subjected
Texas taxpayers to a corporate income tax,'02 taxpayers continue to
restructure businesses in an effort to mitigate the effects of a four and a
half percent tax that, many taxpayers claim, has the effect of taxing in-
come earned prior to enactment of the statute. 03
Much speculation occurred during the Survey period as to whether the
comptroller intended to assert that limited partners or holders of a bene-
ficial interest in a trust have nexus with Texas for franchise tax purposes,
merely by virtue of such interests, if the underlying partnership or trust is
doing business in Texas. To place this speculation in context, it is impor-
tant to note that some taxpayers have sought to escape franchise tax by
converting from an entity that, by its nature, is subject to the tax (i.e., a
97. 19 Tex. Reg. 632 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.292(h)).
98. 19 Tex. Reg. 9164 (1994) (prop. amend. to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.330, 3.333,
3.342, 3.343, 3.354, 3.355, 3.356, 3.357).
99. Under the current rule, when non-taxable unrelated services and taxable services
are sold or purchased for a single charge and the taxable services are greater than five
percent of the total charge, the entire single charge is presumed taxable. See, e.g., 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.330(d)(2), 3.333(h)(2), 3.342(f)(2) (West 1994).
100. 19 Tex. Reg. 9165-67 (1994) (prop. amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.330,
3.333, 3.342, 3.343, 3.354, 3.355, 3.356, 3.357). Examples of acceptable proof of the percent-
age of non-taxable services include the following: written contracts detailing the scope of
work, bid sheets, tally sheets, schedules of values or blueprints. See Policy Statement: Sales
Tax, TAX POLIcY NEWS, Dec. 1994, at 4.
101. TAX POLICY NEWS, Dec. 1994, at 4.
102. See Act of Apr. 29, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 901, § 53(a), 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws
3218, amended by, Act of Aug. 6, 1991, 72d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 5, § 8.01 Gen. Laws 154;(House Bill 11 discussed at Cynthia M. Ohlenforst & Jeff W. Dorrill, Taxation, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 2093, 2102 (1992)).
103. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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corporation'0 4) to an entity that, by its nature, is not subject to tax (e.g., a
partnership or a trust). Since business reasons often demand limited lia-
bility, these restructurings often involve using a partnership or trust in
conjunction with a corporation. One alternative involves doing business
in a limited partnership; a corporation may become a partner in a part-
nership to which it contributes its business assets and activities. Because
the comptroller treats a general partner as doing business in Texas if the
partnership is doing business in Texas, 10 5 the general partner will be sub-
ject to franchise tax and therefore is normally allocated only a minimal
interest (as in one percent) in the partnership. The other partner(s) in
the partnership are generally limited partners that are intended to have
no nexus with Texas.10 6 When this structure is properly implemented,
neither the partnership nor the limited partner is subject to franchise tax;
rather, only the general partner's small share of income is subject to the
earned surplus component of the franchise tax.
A second alternative adopted by some taxpayers involves moving their
business assets and activities into a business trust designed to be treated
as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. Since trusts are not
subject to the franchise tax,107 the trust's income should not be subject to
the franchise tax. Distributions from the trust are designed to be divi-
dends for federal tax purposes, and therefore excludable from the income
of the trust's corporate parent.
Because of widespread publicity about the partnership plan, many
speculated that the comptroller would assert that a corporation holding a
limited partnership interest in a partnership which does business in Texas
is, by virtue of that interest, doing business in Texas. However, as of the
end of the Survey period, the comptroller had indicated that he does not
intend (for now, at least) to adopt that position. If the comptroller
changed his mind, he would likely propose legislation to extend the tax to
limited partners. However, in view of the well-established regulation
stating explicitly that limited partners are not subject to franchise tax
solely as a result of their partnership interest,10 8 it is likely that the comp-
troller does not have the regulatory authority to change this
interpretation. 09
104. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995), which imposes
franchise tax on corporations, as defined therein, doing business in Texas.
105. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.546(c)(12)(A) (West 1994) (acting as a general
partner in a general partnership which is doing business in Texas listed as an example of
doing business) and 3.554(d)(20) (conducting activity listed as doing business in § 3.546 is
doing business) (see 18 Tex. Reg. 5652-54 (Aug. 24, 1993) for text of Rule 3.554).
106. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.546(c)(12)(B) (holding a limited partnership inter-
est is not sufficient, without more, to constitute doing business in Texas).
107. As noted at text accompanying supra note 104, only corporations, as defined in the
Texas Tax Code, are subject to the tax. Texas has long recognized that an unincorporated
trust under state law is a trust for franchise tax purposes, regardless of its characterization
for federal income tax purposes.
108. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
109. Although there was widespread speculation in early 1994 that the comptroller
would seek legislation in the 1995 session to treat such a limited partner as subject to the
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In response to the business trust plan, the comptroller has asserted that
the trust's beneficiary (generally the corporate parent or other affiliate of
the trust for federal income tax purposes) has nexus with Texas if it con-
trols the trust.110 However, this response meets the comptroller's goal (of
taxing the trust's income) only if the comptroller can also succeed in ar-
guing that the trust's income should be included in the corporate benefici-
ary's income for franchise tax purposes, notwithstanding the fact that the
income is distributed as a dividend.
The comptroller's Preliminary Legislative Proposals for the 1995 regu-
lar session"' did not include legislation to extend the tax to limited part-
ners, or to tax trusts and partnerships. Thus, although there is no
guarantee that the legislature will not adopt such changes, most state tax
practitioners do not expect dramatic franchise tax changes from the 1995
Legislature. Nonetheless, some of the proposed "clean-up" changes are
noteworthy. The plan to follow the most current Internal Revenue Code
(rather than the 1990 version required by the current statute"12) means,
for example, that taxpayers will no longer be required to compute sepa-
rately for federal and state purposes the deductions for amortization of
intangible assets and for business entertainment. 1 3 On the other hand,
since some of the differences between the former and current Internal
Revenue Codes reduce the deductions available to taxpayers, this change
will effectively increase franchise tax burden for some taxpayers. 114
In the controversial arena of extending jurisdiction to taxpayers who
sell intangibles in the state, Texas, like other states, continues to grapple
with the impact of Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission."15
As of the end of the Survey period, Texas, recognizing the difficulty (both
from a practical and legal standpoint) of structuring a set of rules to ad-
dress the taxation of companies licensing intangibles in the state, had not
adopted regulations or proposed legislation to change Texas law in this
arena. 116 Moreover, comptroller representatives consistently confirmed
franchise tax, as of the end of the Survey period, the comptroller was not planning to
propose such legislation.
110. See, e.g., Letter: Franchise Tax, TAX POLIcY NEws, Dec. 1994, at 3 (summarizing a
ruling in which the comptroller concluded that a Pennsylvania Business Trust doing busi-
ness in Texas is not subject to Texas franchise tax since it is not a corporation, limited
liability company, bank, or savings and loan under Pennsylvania law. However, the comp-
troller also concluded that a corporation that has direct or indirect control over such a trust(including control over the trustee) is subject to tax (summarizing microfiche 1315G09)).
111. These draft proposals are dated June 24, 1994.
112. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(b)(4) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995) (defining In-
ternal Revenue Code for purposes of the franchise tax statutes).
113. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 197 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (amortization of intangibles).
114. The comptroller has prepared a sample worksheet for C corporations reversing the
effects of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 that lists the differences between the
1990 Internal Revenue Code and the current Code.
115. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 550 (1993). As noted in 1994 Tax
Survey at 1659-60, the Geoffrey court permitted South Carolina to impose a tax based in
large part on a corporation's licensing trademarks and trade names for use in the state.
116. While many taxpayers are worried that Texas' adopting the Geoffrey test would
increase taxes, some companies might benefit from the adoption. Under TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. §§ 171.103(1) (Vernon 1992) and 171.1032(a)(1) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995) (the
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that the comptroller did not intend to assert that franchise tax is owed by
corporations whose sole connection to Texas during 1994 was the licens-
ing of intangibles into the state.117 Nonetheless, in other areas, taxpayers
and the comptroller disagreed as to the reach of the state's taxing author-
ity. Lawrence Industries, Inc. v. Sharp,118 for example, focused on the
degree of activity required to constitute doing business in Texas for
franchise tax purposes. Although there was conflicting testimony as to
some of the facts, 119 the lower court held that the corporation's principal
place of business was in Texas and that it managed and directed at least
some of the affairs of its subsidiaries from Texas.120 The court concluded
that these activities easily fell within the doing business standards, and
that Lawrence therefore had nexus with Texas.
B. CALCULATION AND ALLOCATION OF TAXABLE CAPITAL AND
EARNED SURPLUS
Judicial and administrative cases continue to focus on how to calculate
taxable capital for franchise tax purposes. In Browning-Ferris Industries
v. Bullock'2' the district court held that intercompany payables are re-
ceipts to the parent corporation. Tandy Corporation v. Sharp'22 ad-
dressed the proper computation of receipts for the survivor of a merger
"throw-back" rule), receipts from sales into a state with which a taxpayer does not have
nexus are treated as Texas receipts. If Texas adopted a broader nexus standard, then tax-
payers would be treated - for purposes of §§ 171.103 and 171.1032 - as having nexus
with states into which they license intangible sales. Such states would not be subject to the
Texas throw-back rule, creating the possibility that Texas franchise taxes for taxpayers with
sales into such states would decrease. Another issue involving sales of intangibles is the
sourcing, for Texas franchise tax purposes, of receipts from a sale of stock. The comptrol-
ler confirmed his view that stock sales are not generally allocated under TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 171.1061 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995). See TAX POLICY NEWS, Aug. 1994, at 5 (A
Delaware holding company domiciled in Texas sells stock in subsidiary. Stock sale is not
taxable in the other states in which the parent corporation does business; however, corpo-
rate activities are unitary. Stock sale will therefore be subject to apportionment rather
than to allocation.) See also TAX POLICY NEWS, May 1994, at 4.
117. This position is decidedly more advantageous to taxpayers than the comptroller's
November 1993 announcement that a corporation licensing intangibles into the state
would, effective January 1, 1994, be considered "doing business" in Texas and therefore
have nexus for franchise tax purposes. TAX POLICY NEWS, Nov. 1993, at 6.
118. 890 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ requested). See also Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,608 (June 3, 1994) (acknowledging that "this is a close case,"
the administrative law judge held that petitioner had provided some services and that peti-
tioner's employees had "occasionally made trips to Texas to facilitate some portion of Peti-
tioner's business"; although the petitioner disputed the tax division's characterization of
facts, the taxpayer could not produce proof to rebut the tax division's assertions).
119. The court of appeals focused in part on whether the issues presented on appeal
were issues of fact or law, and determined that the finding that Lawrence was doing busi-
ness in Texas was the "ultimate finding of fact." 890 S.W.2d at 888-89.
120. Particularly damning, in the court's view, was the fact that Lawrence's Delaware
franchise tax return for the year had listed Conroe, Texas as Lawrence's "principal place of
business outside of Delaware." Id. at 890.
121. No. 392,894 (353d Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Apr. 6, 1994) (judge ruled for
state following Sept. 27, 1993 bench trial).
122. 872 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
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under section 171.153(c) as then in effect. 123 The rules on calculating
franchise taxes following a merger in section 171.153(c) required Tandy to
calculate its receipts for both its 1986 report year and its 1987 report year
by reference to periods that included an overlapping period of time (and
receipts). The effect was to require Tandy to include an extraordinarily
large Texas receipt ($100,000,000) in both years' calculations of receipts.
Effectively, Tandy argued, it was taxed twice on the same receipts. Ac-
cording to Tandy, the comptroller's interpretation of section 171.153(c),
providing an alternate reporting period for the period following certain
mergers, 24 was not based on determining "business done" during the
preceding year, and was therefore an incorrect interpretation of the
law. 125 The court refused to accept Tandy's argument that "business
done" is distinct from "financial condition" in the statute and held that
"[d]espite the hardship imposed on this taxpayer under these circum-
stances," the comptroller's interpretation is correct. 126
General Dynamics Corp. v. Sharp, 27 which challenges the 1991 enact-
ment of the earned surplus component of the franchise tax, was still pend-
ing at the end of the Survey period, although cross-motions for summary
judgment were set for hearing in January 1995. General Dynamics has
argued that, by modifying the franchise tax in 1991, the legislature en-
acted a retroactive income tax, in violation of both the Texas and United
States Constitutions. 128 General Dynamics had entered into a contract
with the United States in 1984, and elected to report its income for fed-
eral income tax purposes on the "completed contract" method, so that
most of its income on the contract was not reported until the contract was
complete. General Dynamics' first tax return to be fied after the 1991
enactment of the earned surplus tax was based on the company's 1991
income. Unfortunately for General Dynamics, 1991 was the year in
which the company accrued its net income on the 1984 contract - $974
million. Thus, the timing of the franchise tax effective date proved very
expensive for General Dynamics. Recognizing that Texas courts have not
addressed the precise question raised by its challenge to the franchise tax,
General Dynamics' briefs rely heavily on several Ohio cases. 129 In briefs
123. Act of Apr. 2, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 31, § 8, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 405, 406-07(TEX. TAX CODE § 171.153 as then in effect).
124. 872 S.W.2d at 817.
125. Id
126. Id at 818. The parties agreed that the § 171.153 provision at issue had been
designed to thwart taxpayers who were trying to take advantage of a previously-existing
tax loophole. It was, for Tandy, a loophole closing that proved to have unanticipated costs.
Id
127. No. 92-11498 (353d Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Apr. 13, 1995).
128. Specifically, the taxpayer argues that the law violates TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16
(prohibiting retroactive ex-post-facto laws) and U.S. CONsT. amend. V, XIV (Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution). General Dynamics Corp.
v. Shop, No. 92-11498, Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
129. See, e.g., Lakengren, Inc. v. Kosydar, 339 N.E. 2d 814 (Ohio 1975). This reliance
on Ohio law is not without basis, since the Texas Legislature borrowed from Ohio's stat-
utes in enacting Texas franchise law and since the states have similar constitutional re-
straints on retroactive laws. Cf. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("[N]o... retroactive law or any
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in another franchise tax case, 130 the comptroller has stated that General
Dynamics implicates most of the franchise tax revenue for the 1992 re-
port year. In addressing General Dynamics' arguments, the court may
ultimately focus not only on the retroactive nature of the tax, but also on
the extent to which taxpayers had remedies available to mitigate the im-
pact of the new tax.' 3 '
Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. Sharp132 is one of several cases still pend-
ing in which taxpayers have challenged the comptroller's assertion that
operating lease obligations are not "debt" within the meaning of section
171.109(a)(3), 133 and therefore may not be deducted from surplus. Other
pending cases focus on the deductibility from surplus of pension and
other post-retirement benefits as debts, 34 as taxpayers argue that section
171.1090)(1) 135 is effectively a substantive law change applied
retroactively. 136
In Harken Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Sharp,137 the Austin Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's holding that the pre-acquisition earnings of a
second-tier subsidiary may not be deducted from surplus. Although the
appellate court did not overrule State v. Sun Refining & Marketing,
Inc.,138 on which the taxpayer had relied, the court so limited Sun Refin-
ing to its facts that, on this issue, the case will likely not be relied on again
unless the Texas Supreme Court holds differently from Harken.
While many franchise tax cases are pending, several of the numerous
administrative hearing decisions issued during the Survey period focused
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be made") with OHIO CONST. art. 2, § 28
(the general assembly "shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the
obligation of contracts.").
130. Lawrence Indus,, Inc. v. Sharp, 890 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).
131. Such an analysis would be particularly interesting since the comptroller promul-
gated 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.572 (as proposed at 16 Tex. Reg. 6847 (Nov. 26, 1991) to
deter taxpayers from choosing one of the remedies available to taxpayers - effecting a
merger into a new corporation. That rule, together with the legislature's enactment of
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.363 (Vernon 1992), which treats non-compliance with the
comptroller's rules as a potential criminal offense, convinced many taxpayers that the risks
of changing form to avoid the tax were too great. (The comptroller subsequently aban-
doned the most controversial part of Rule 3.572; see Cynthia M. Ohlenforst & Jeff W.
Dorrill, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 Sw. L.J. 1803, 1815 (1993) for a discus-
sion of Rule 3.572).
132. No. 94-05328 (167th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.) (filed May 5, 1994).
133. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(a)(3) (Vernon 1992).
134. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Sharp, No. 93-11176 (299th Dist. Ct., Travis County,
Tex.) (settled May 8, 1995).
135. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(j)(1) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
136. The case was originally set for trial in late 1994, but the parties agreed to defer trial
until 1995.
137. 873 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ), affirming No. 91-19926 (345th
Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., May 27, 1993) (granting the state's motion for summary
judgment).
138. 740 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
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on the same issues, 139 such as debt versus equity characterizations, 140
push-down accounting, 141 and the need to declare dividends formally in
order to reduce the declaring corporation's surplus. 42
In addition, several administrative decisions focus on the types of ac-
counting changes the comptroller will permit. 43 In one decision, for ex-
ample, the comptroller correctly held as acceptable a pre-planned
conversion from the double declining balance method of depreciation to
the straight line method in accordance with the depreciation rules under
the Internal Revenue Code. The tax division had argued that this auto-
matic change somehow constituted choosing a different method of ac-
counting, so that a corporation could not make such a change more than
once every four years without the comptroller's consent. 1'"
139. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,988 (Jan. 21, 1994) (employee
welfare and pension plan expenses not deductible from surplus). This taxpayer filed suit
following the denial of its motion for rehearing in the administrative case. See also USX v.
Sharp, No. 94-04991 (53d Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.) (filed Apr. 28, 1994); Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,359 (Oct. 7, 1994) (pension liability account, vacation pay
liability account are not debt within the meaning of TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(a)(3)
(Vernon 1992)); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,634 (Nov. 22, 1994) (various ac-
counts, including for accrued vacation pay, royalties, product liability and others, not ex-
cludable from surplus). See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,563 (Oct. 28,
1994) (taxpayer not entitled to deduct unfunded employee benefit accounts, including pen-
sion plan, vested vacation, worker's compensation and other plans, from surplus).
140. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,990 (Feb. 16, 1994) (intercorpo-
rate advances from corporate family members should not be reclassified as surplus; tax-
payer had consistently treated the intercompany advances as debts on its books, tax
returns, and financial statements; taxpayer's debt-to-equity ratios were at least as good as
the ratios set forth in other cited comptroller decisions; decision reviews comptroller's
debt-equity criteria); see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,444 (Feb. 8, 1994)
(preferred stock not debt for franchise tax purposes); TAX POLICY NEWS, Aug. 1994, at 5
(noting that dividends are excluded from taxable capital as of the date of declaration if
they are declared in accordance with the state of incorporation law and are paid within one
year).
141. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 29,404,29,405 (Nov. 30, 1993) (his-
torical cost for 1987 report year; contrasting taxpayer-favorable decisions); Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 27,377 & 27,378 (Mar. 24, 1993) (for some taxpayers for post-
1987 years).
142. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,584 (Dec. 29, 1994) (dividend not ex-
cluded from surplus until date of formal declaration by board, although book entries and
intent to declare dividend were earlier).
143. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,118 (not yet released in final form at the
end of the Survey period).
144. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(e) (Vernon 1992). See also Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 26,765 (Nov. 2, 1994) (permitting taxpayers to switch from units of
production depreciation to the double declining balance) (proposed administrative deci-
sion had ruled for state on this point); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,893 (Aug.
16, 1994) (accelerated depreciation versus straightline; inquiry focused in part on whether
taxpayer's first set of amended returns related back to the original filing date); Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,831 (Oct. 12, 1994) (changes in length of estimated useful life
and salvage value not permitted as change of accounting method); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 29,757 (Sept. 21, 1994) (permitting conversion from units of production to
double declining balance). In another hearing, Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No.
29,754A (June 3, 1994), the comptroller held that 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.391(b)(6)(c)( West 1994), which permitted taxpayers to convert from GAAP to GAAP
accounting measures, did not extend the statute of limitations.
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As noted above, 1995 legislative changes are likely to impact calcula-
tion of the earned surplus tax to the extent the franchise tax is calculated
by reference to the 1990 Internal Revenue Code.' 45 Also, as Texas tax
principles become more tied to unitary issues and to constitutional chal-
lenges, non-Texas cases take on increased significance to Texas
taxpayers. 46
C. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The comptroller revised only a handful of franchise tax rules during the
Survey period. The rule on nexus for earned surplus purposes147 was
adopted without changes from the version proposed in August 1993.148
This rule, which reflects much of the Multistate Tax Commission's analy-
sis of Public Law 86-272,149 adopts the "constitutional limit standard" for
nexus, and provides numerous specific examples of activities that may be
protected from state tax by Public Law 86-272.
Three other rules became effective in February 1994: the rules on of-
ficer and director compensation for earned surplus purposes, 150 limited
liability companies,' 5' and provisional exemptions 152 (dealing with ex-
emptions for corporations that have applied to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice for an exemption from federal income tax). The limited liability
company rule states that such entities will generally be taxed as though
they were a C corporation, 153 and provides some rules for determining
145. The Texas Tax Code was tied to the 1990 Internal Revenue Code because the
Texas drafters were concerned that allowing the franchise tax to be based on federal legis-
lation would be treated as an improper delegation of Texas legislative power to the federal
government; by contrast, however, Texas legislators provided that the franchise tax would
be based on GAAP. In view of this contrast, it is not too surprising that the state's reliance
on GAAP has been challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
146. In Barclays Bank P.L.C. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 114 S. Ct. 2268,
2276-77 (1994), one of the most eagerly-awaited Supreme Court state tax cases in years,
the Court held that worldwide combined reporting for unitary business groups with a for-
eign parent did not violate Commerce Clause or Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. In the companion case, Colgate-Palmolive Co., id., the Court confirmed that
worldwide combined reporting was constitutional as applied to worldwide unitary group
with a United States-based parent.
147. 19 Tex. Reg. 1545 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.554) (Earned sur-
plus: Nexus). See 1994 Tax Survey at 1662-63 and accompanying text for discussion.
148. See 18 Tex. Reg. 5652 (1993) for rule language.
149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 383-84 (1988).
150. 19 Tex. Reg. 633 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558. The prelimi-
nary budget estimates that accompanied the 1991 enactment of the earned surplus compo-
nent of the franchise tax had projected that as much as half of the revenue to be generated
by the franchise tax revisions would result from the TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(b)
(Vernon 1992) add-back of officer and director compensation; however, the actual tax in-
crease attributed to the add-back has been much lower than those revenue estimates. See
also 1994 Tax Survey at 1662-63 and accompanying text for discussion.
151. 19 Tex. Reg. 633 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562 adopted with-
out change to the proposed text at 18 Tex. Reg. 8346 (Nov. 12, 1993). See 1994 Tax Survey
at 1662-63 and accompanying text for discussion.
152. 19 Tex. Reg. 633 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.573). See 1994 Tax
Survey at 1662-63 and accompanying text for discussion.
153. 19 Tex. Reg. 633 (1994) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562(d)).
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how such calculations are made. For example, one such rule provides
that a corporate member's distributive share of a limited liability com-
pany's items of income or loss is not included in the corporate member's
earned surplus to the extent the items are reported at the limited liability
company level. 154
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
In a case of first impression, a Harris County Court of Appeals in
Spring Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist.155 held that Sec-
tions 23.12(f) and (g) of the Tax Code 156 are unconstitutional. 157 These
sections allow owners of inventory to elect to have their inventory ap-
praised as of September 1 of the year preceding the tax year rather than
January 1 of the tax year.158 In this case, Enron elected to have its natu-
ral gas inventory appraised as of September 1, 1989, instead of January 1,
1990. On September 1, the inventory was valued at approximately $78.3
million versus the approximately $93.2 value that would have been placed
on the inventory had it been valued as of January 1, 1990 (because a
larger amount of gas was stored on January 1). As a result of Enron's
ability to elect to value the inventory on September 1 instead of January
1, Spring I.S.D. asserted that it lost over $220,000 in tax revenue for the
1990 tax year.
The court ruled that the statutes violate three distinct principles set
forth in the Texas Constitution: (i) taxation must be equal and uniform; 59
(ii) all property must be taxed in proportion to its value; 160 and (iii) the
Texas Legislature may not exempt property without constitutional au-
thorization.16' In concluding that sections 23.12(f) and (g) violate princi-
ples of equality and uniformity, the court reasoned that the statutes treat
inventory differently from non-inventory and that there is not a rational
basis for the disparate treatment, given that the sole purpose of enabling
154. Id. (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562(h)(2)(A)).
155. 889 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
156. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.12(f), (g) (Vernon 1992), amended by Act of 1993, 73d
Leg., R.S., ch. 672, §§ 1, 2, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2501-04 (1993). Section 23.12(g) expired
by its own terms on January 1, 1991. See Act of 1991, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 796, § 16, 1989
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3596-97 (1989).
157. Spring I.S.D., 889 S.W.2d at 567.
158. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.12(f) (Vernon Supp. 1995). Section 23.12(f) allows the
owners of inventory other than motor vehicles to elect to have their inventory appraised at
market value of September 1 of the year preceding the relevant tax year by filing an appli-
cation with the chief appraiser requesting such valuation. The application applies to tax
years beginning after the next August 1 following the date the application is filed unless the
owner later revokes the election before September 1 of the following year. Id.
159. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a).
160. Id. art. VIII, § 1(b).
161. Id. art. VIII, § 2.
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inventory owners to choose what the court views as an arbitrary valuation
date is to lower inventory owners' tax burden. 162
With respect to the conclusion that sections 23.12(f) and (g) cause
property not to be taxed in proportion to value, the court noted that En-
ron's natural gas was located in the same reservoir as other natural gas
that was valued as of January 1 (because not all other gas owners made
the election to value the gas as of September 1), and reasoned that using
two different values for the same property creates an ambiguity concern-
ing the natural gas' value and results in the property not being taxed in
proportion to value.163 Finally, the court reasoned that by allowing a
September 1 valuation date, inventory added after September 1 and
before January 1 is effectively exempted from tax for the year. The Texas
Constitution provides that the Texas Legislature cannot expand the prop-
erty tax exemptions required or permitted by the Texas Constitution.
Given that the Texas Constitution does not permit a special exemption
for inventory, 164 the court concluded that sections 23.12(f) and (g) uncon-
stitutionally exempt property from taxation.165
Several cases during the Survey period addressed the constitutionality
of taxation of in-transit personal property. These cases are an indication
that Texas courts narrowly interpret, in the context of property taxation,
the Commerce Clause 166 and the Import-Export Clause 167 of the United
States Constitution. In Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Virginia Indone-
sia Co.168 a Houston Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's sum-
mary judgment in favor of the taxpayer, Virginia Indonesia Company
(VICO), that the appraisal district's assessment of property taxes against
162. Spring LS.D., 889 S.W.2d at 566. If this opinion is upheld on appeal, it may offer
taxing authorities an additional argument for setting aside the inventory valuations of busi-
nesses that have established related corporations, with different valuation dates, to own
inventory at different times of the year.
163. Id at 568.
164. In another decision addressing whether a property tax exemption violates article
VIII, § 2 of the Texas Constitution, the Attorney General in Opinion No. DM-301 ruled
that the property tax exemption under § 11.29 of the Tax Code, providing that land dedi-
cated by easement as a disposal site for materials dredged from the Gulf Intracoastal Wa-
terway is exempt from tax, is unconstitutional. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-301 (1994).
The Attorney General reasoned that disposal sites for material dredged from the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway are not included within the Texas Constitution's list of permissive
statutory exemptions. Id.
165. Spring LS.D., 889 S.W.2d at 568. Query whether the special valuation methods
used for motor vehicle dealers under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 23.12A and 23.12B (Vernon
Supp. 1995), are constitutional given that a January 1 valuation date is not used. These
sections require motor vehicle dealers to pay property taxes on inventory based on the
average inventory over the prior twelve-month period, and to make monthly deposits
based on vehicles sold during the months. Id. In Chicago Pac. Corp. v. Limbach, 605
N.E.2d 8 (Ohio 1992), the Ohio Supreme Court held a that a daily average method of
valuation was constitutional because it avoided the "inequality of fluctuating inventories."
Id. at 12. The valuation methods required by § 23.12A have similarities to a daily average
method of valuation.
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 3.
167. Id. art. I, § 10, cI. 2.
168. 871 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ granted).
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VICO's in-transit goods, destined for Indonesia, was unconstitutional. 169
VICO purchased goods and equipment for use by a related joint venture.
The goods and equipment were shipped to VICO in Texas, were then
inspected and packaged in Texas and finally were sent to Indonesia. The
taxing unit imposed property taxes on these goods and equipment which
were located in Harris County on January 1, 1991. VICO challenged the
tax on its in-transit goods, claiming that the tax violated the Commerce
Clause and the Import-Export Clause. 170 In addressing the Commerce
Clause, the court applied the six prongs of the Commerce Clause test
established by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady171 and Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.' 72 The primary issue with respect to the
Commerce Clause was whether the tax violated the requirement under
Japan Line that the tax not enhance the risk of multiple international
taxation. Although the goods were clearly destined for Indonesia, the
court concluded that VICO did not prove as a matter of law that the
multiple taxation test was violated, reasoning that the mere potential for
multiple taxation is not sufficient; rather, the court indicated that the tax-
payer must provide evidence of multiple taxation. 73
The court also rejected VICO's position that the tax on its goods vio-
lated, as a matter of law, the Import-Export Clause.' 74 The court applied
the three factor test used in Intel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston175
and concluded VICO did not prove as a matter of law that any of the
three factors were met. 176 The court focused on the third prong on the
Huddleston test, which asks whether the tax diverts import-derived reve-
169. Id. at 866.
170. Id. at 867.
171. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
172. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). The tests applied by Complete Auto Transit and Japan Line
are whether the tax:
(1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2)
is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce;
(4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state, . . (5) [does] not
create a substantial risk of multiple international taxation, and (6) Idoesl not
prevent the federal government from speaking with one voice when regulat-
ing commercial relations with foreign governments.
Virginia Indonesia Co., 871 S.W.2d at 868 (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 869-70. The court distinguished Japan Line, concluding that in Japan Line
the taxpayer submitted "evidence of multiple international taxation in fact." Id at 870.
174. Id. at 871.
175. 113 S. Ct. 1095 (1993). The current import-export clause test is based on the main
concerns prompting the framers of the Constitution to adopt the import-export clause.
The test has three elements:
(1) Does the challenged tax impair the federal government from speaking
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments?
(2) Does the tax threaten to disturb harmony among the states by allowing
seaboard states, with their crucial ports of entry, to levy taxes on citizens of
other states by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports? or,
(3) Does the tax divert import-derived revenue from the federal government
to the states?
Virginia Indonesia Co., 871 S.W.2d at 871 (citing Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. at 1105).
176. Virginia Indonesia Co., 871 S.W.2d at 871.
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nue from the federal government to the taxing state. The court con-
cluded the third test was not met because goods destined for export do
not implicate import revenues. 177
The Texarkana Court of Appeals in Melton Truck Lines, Inc. v. Gregg
County Appraisal Dist.178 held that trucks headquartered in Louisiana
and which traveled through Gregg County in interstate business were tax-
able in Gregg County. 179 The trucks were never located in the county for
longer than a temporary period. However, the trucks' owner (Melton)
registered trucks for proportional registration in Gregg County pursuant
to the International Registration Plan. The taxing unit asserted that the
trucks were taxable in Gregg County under section 21.02(a)(4) of the Tax
Code, 80 which provides that property is taxable by a taxing unit if the
owner maintains his principal place of business in Texas in the taxing unit
and the property is taxable in Texas but does not have a taxable situs
under sections 21.02(a)(1), (2) or (3).181 Melton asserted that its principal
place of business was in Louisiana and, thus, it did not have a principal
place of business in Gregg County.182 The court concluded, however,
that section 21.02(a)(4) merely requires the taxpayer's principal place of
business in Texas to be in Gregg County, and that Melton's registering its
trucks in Gregg County evidenced that Melton had established a place of
business (and its principal place of business in Texas) in Gregg County.183
177. Id. VICO, however, did not leave the Court of Appeals without one victory. The
court agreed with VICO that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that VICO had
applied for a freeport exemption. Id. at 876. Although VICO had not completed a free-
port exemption application form, its 1991 rendition stated that "we hereby apply for prop-
erty tax exemption." Id. at 875 (quoting VICO's 1991 Rendition of Business Personal
Property). VICO also failed to check the box on the rendition form claiming the freeport
exemption. The appraisal district had granted VICO freeport exemptions in 1989 and 1990
even though VICO had applied for the freeport exemption in the same manner for those
years as it did in 1991. The court ruled that, based on the "unique facts of the case," VICO
established that it applied for a freeport exemption in 1991, although the court noted that
its opinion should not be read to condone VICO's failure to comply with the appraisal
district's rules for applying for a freeport exemption. Id. at 876.
178. 864 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
179. Id at 140.
180. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.02(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
181. Id.
182. Melton also asserted that the tax in the facts at hand violated the Commerce
Clause. Melton, 864 S.W.2d at 140. The court disagreed, reasoning that Melton's trucks
avail themselves of Texas' and Gregg County's roads, thus enjoying the benefits and pro-
tections provided by those entities. Id.
183. Id. at 139. In another case addressing the constitutionality of taxation of in-transit
goods, the Texas Supreme Court in Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mkt. Co. v. Nueces County
Appraisal Dist., 876 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 500 (1994), affirmed the San
Antonio Court of Appeals' decision that the imposition of property taxes on crude oil
imported into the United States and temporarily stored in .the county before being trans-
ported to its final destination, which was in Texas, did not violate either the Import-Export





TWo decisions during the Survey period addressed whether an appraisal
district can deny an exemption in a circumstance in which the taxpayer
was entitled to the exemption during the immediately preceding year, and
the chief appraiser did not request the taxpayers complete a new exemp-
tion application for the current year.
In Inwood Dad's Club, Inc. v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist.'84 the Houston
[1st Dist.] Court of Appeals held that the charitable organization prop-
erty tax exemption granted to the plaintiff (Inwood) in 1984 extended
through later years because the chief appraiser did not deliver to Inwood
a notice under section 11.43(c) of the Tax Code185 requesting a new appli-
cation for exemption.' 86 Section 11.43(c) provides that once an exemp-
tion under certain of the exemption provisions (including the charitable
organization exemption) is allowed, the exemption applies in later years
until the property changes ownership or the person's qualification for the
exemption changes.187 Section 11.43(c) further provides that the chief
appraiser may require a taxpayer allowed an exemption in a prior year to
file a new application to confirm his or her current qualification for the
exemption by delivering written notice that a new application is re-
quired. 188 The taxing units asserted that this provision is permissive, not
mandatory, and that the delinquent tax notices sent by the taxing units
during the relevant years were sufficient notice that the tax exemption
had been denied. 189 In rejecting the taxing units' approach, the court
concluded that section 11.43(c) is primarily a mandatory provision, and
that the chief appraiser's failure to request a taxpayer to confirm his qual-
ification for exemption allows the exemption to continue without further
confirmation. 190
The taxing units also argued that Inwood waived its right to complain
of the failure to receive a request for a new exemption application be-
cause Inwood did not timely protest the loss of the exemption to the ap-
praisal review board. The court also rejected this argument, concluding
that Inwood had nothing to protest before the appraisal review board
given that its charitable organization exemption had not been properly
denied; thus, the appraisal district's removal of Inwood's exemption was a
void act that could be challenged at any time.191
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals' decision in Harris County Appraisal
Dist. v. Dincans'92 appears to be somewhat at odds with the decision in
Inwood Dad's Club. In Dincans the taxpayer qualified for open-space
184. 882 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
185. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
186. Inwood Dad's Club, 882 S.W.2d at 539.
187. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
188. Id.
189. Inwood Dad's Club, 802 S.W.2d at 534.
190. Id. at 535.
191. Id. at 538.
192. 882 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
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valuation in 1982. In 1983, the appraisal district did not grant the tax-
payer open-space land designation; however, the chief appraiser also did
not request taxpayer to file a new application or send any notice ex-
pressly stating that the open-space designation was denied. The only way
the taxpayer would have known that the open-space land designation was
denied for the 1983-year was that the notice of appraised value listed the
current market value of the property without listing the agricultural
value. Years later, the taxpayer challenged the denial of the open-space
designation for the 1983 year (and later years).
The court ruled that, assuming the notice of appraised value had been
delivered to taxpayer, the taxpayer had failed to exhaust its administra-
tive remedies because it had not timely filed a protest with the appraisal
review board. 193 The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the ap-
praisal district's failure to request a new application under section
23.54(e) of the Tax Code' 94 for open-space designation absolved taxpayer
from failure to protest, concluding that section 23.54(e) should be read in
a manner which is not inconsistent with section 25.19 of the Tax Code, 195
which requires the chief appraiser to deliver a written notice of valuation
in certain circumstances. 196
The wording of section 23.54(e) is strikingly similar to the wording of
section 11.43(c), discussed in Inwood above. Indeed, section 23.54(e)
provides that "[o]nce an application is filed and [special] appraisal [as
open-space land] is allowed, the land is eligible for [open-space land valu-
ation] in subsequent years without a new application unless the owner-
193. Id. at 78. The court declined to grant the appraisal district's motion for summaryjudgment because there was not sufficient evidence establishing that the notice of ap-
praised value had been delivered to the taxpayer.
194. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.54(e) (Vernon 1992).
195. Id. § 25.19. The taxpayer in Dincans asserted that the notice provisions in§ 23.54(e) prevailed over the notice provisions in § 25.19. Dincans, 882 S.W.2d at 77.
However, one can make a strong argument that taxpayer could have prevailed in this case
without having to prove that the notice provisions in § 23.54(e) control over those in§ 25.19. Indeed, even if property is eligible for an open-space exemption, the chief ap-
praiser is still required to list in a § 25.19 notice both the market value and the agricultural
value of the property. (The market value of the property is determined so that the amount
of rollback taxes can be calculated if a change in use occurs. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.55(Vernon 1992)). Therefore, merely because a § 25.19 notice lists the market value of prop-
erty does not mean that the appraisal district has concluded that the property is no longer
eligible for open-space valuation. Rather, the § 25.19 notice and the § 23.54(e) notice have
different purposes. By holding that the notice provisions in § 25.19 prevail over the notice
provisions under § 23.54(e), the Dincans court appears to eliminate, for practical purposes,
the requirement of an appraisal district to send notices under § 23.54(e) in a circumstance
in which the notice under § 25.19 indicates that the agricultural use exemption has been
denied.
196. Section 25.19 requires the chief appraiser to deliver a written notice to the prop-
erty owner of the appraised value of its property if: "(1) the appraised value of the prop-
erty is greater than it[s] [value] in the preceding year;" (2) the property's appraised value is
greater than the property owner's rendition; or "(3) the property was not on the appraisal
roll in the preceding year." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.19(a) (Vernon 1992). In Dincans,
1984 was the first year in which Harris County Appraisal District assumed responsibilities
of appraising and assessing the property at issue. In prior years, Harris County had these
responsibilities. Therefore, Harris County Appraisal District was required to send a notice
under § 25.19(a) because the property was not on its appraisal roll in the preceding year.
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ship changes or its eligibility . . . ends." 197 As with section 11.43(c),
section 23.54(e) then provides that the chief appraiser may require a per-
son to file a new application to confirm that the land is currently eligi-
ble.198 Whereas the court in Inwood read the language in section 11.43(c)
to require the chief appraiser to request a new application for exemption
in order to deny the exemption for later years, the court in Dincans reads
similar language in section 23.54(e) to be precatory (i.e., failure to send
the request for an application does not prevent the appraisal district from
denying the open-space land designation). Until Texas courts resolve this
issue, taxpayers qualifying for an exemption or a special valuation in the
previous year should review carefully the notice of appraised value re-
ceived during the current year to determine whether the appraisal district
has denied the exemption or special valuation for the current year.199
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Scott v. Harris Methodist HEB200
held that a taxpayer lacked standing under the Tax Code and common
law to challenge an exemption granted to another taxpayer.201 The tax-
payer argued that his taxes were higher because of an allegedly improper
exemption granted the hospital. The court concluded, however, that the
Tax Code does not allow taxpayers to challenge exemptions granted
others, and, although Scott's taxes may have been higher than had the
hospital not been granted an exemption, Scott was unable to establish
that he suffered an injury distinct from the taxpaying public-at-large. 20
C. PROCEDURE
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two opinions
concerning taxing units' ability to foreclose on property subject to a tax
lien in circumstances in which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) also has a mortgage lien on the property. In Matagorda County
v. Law20 3 the Fifth Circuit held that taxing units may not foreclose on
property which is subject to an FDIC lien without the FDIC's consent
197. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.54(e) (Vernon 1992) (emphasis added).
198. Id
199. See supra note 90.
200. 871 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ).
201. Id at 550.
202. Id The duty of challenging tax exemptions lies with taxing units. TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 41.03 (Vernon 1992).
203. 19 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1994). In another Fifth Circuit decision concerning property
tax liens, the court addressed the relative priority of an unperfected property tax lien and
a perfected lien held by Chrysler Credit Corporation (Chrysler) against inventory of a
debtor in bankruptcy. Pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.05 (Vernon 1992), property
tax liens have priority over the liens of all other creditors. In re Boerne Hills Leasing
Corp., 15 F.3d 57 (5th Cir. 1994). However, § 32.03(b) provides that tax liens are unen-
forceable against personal property transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value and
without notice of the tax lien. Based on § 32.03, Chrysler asserted that the tax liens were
avoided under § 545(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that the trustee may avoid
the fixing of a statutory lien on property to the extent the lien is not perfected against a
bona fide purchaser. The court concluded, however, that because Chrysler failed to seek
the authorization of the bankruptcy trustee to avoid the lien, the tax liens were not avoided
and retained priority over Chrysler's lien.
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even though the taxing units' liens are superior to the liens acquired by
the FDIC.2° 4 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on section
1825(b) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA),205 which provides that FDIC property shall not
be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure or sale without
the FDIC's consent.206 The taxing units argued that the FDIC's lien was
not "property" within the meaning of the FIRREA regulation; however,
the court reasoned that under federal law, which controls this issue, the
term "property" embraces both the fee and lien interests.207
The taxing units' final argument did, however, catch the court's atten-
tion. The taxing units asserted that failure to award the taxing units re-
covery against the FDIC for the amount secured by the tax lien
effectively constituted a taking without just compensation as prohibited
by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 20 8 As of the
date of the District Court decision, twenty-seven months had passed since
the FDIC acquired its lien on the property. The court ruled that an un-
constitutional taking had not occurred as of the date of the district court
decision because the taxing units' rights had not been sufficiently in-
fringed so as to constitute an unconstitutional taking;20 9 however, the
court pointed out that the twenty-seven-month delay in this case was ap-
proaching the maximum amount of time for the FDIC to resolve matters
without there being a taking requiring compensation. 2 10
The Fifth Circuit in Donna Indep. Sch. Dist. v. BalO" reconfirmed that
taxing units may not foreclose on property subject to an FDIC lien with-
out the FDIC's consent. 21 2 The court again rejected the taxing units' as-
sertion that the FDIC's delay in consenting to a foreclosure by the taxing
units was an unconstitutional taking, although the delay in this case was
204. 19 F.3d at 222-23.
205. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (Supp. V 1993).
206. Id. § 1825(b)(2).
207. Matagorda County, 19 F.3d at 221. The court also indicated that under Texas law
the FDIC's lien might be treated as "property." Id
208. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Although § 1825 did not extinguish the taxing units' liens,
the taxing units argued that the indeterminable delay in being able to foreclose on the lien
constituted a compensable taking. Id. at 223.
209. Id. at 225. In making this determination, the court examined the three factors that
the United States Supreme Court in Penn Cent. RTansp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) considered in addressing whether a regulation constitutes a taking, those
factors being: (i) "[tihe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (ii) "the ex-
tent to which the regulation ... interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations";
and (iii) "the character of the governmental action." Id.
210. Matagorda County, 19 F.3d at 225. In this case, the property was worth approxi-
mately $333,000, the taxing units' liens were for approximately $52,000, and the FDIC's
lien totalled over $890,000. It at 217, 225 n.11. Given that the taxing units' liens had
priority over the FDIC's liens and that the value of the property was over six times the
amount of the taxing units' liens, it is not clear how the taxing units have suffered a taking
as a result of the FDIC's delay in consenting to the foreclosure. Unless it is reasonably
possible that the property would substantially drop in value, there should be adequate
value to satisfy the taxing units' liens even if the foreclosure were delayed well beyond the
27-month period.
211. 21 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1994).
212. Id. at 101.
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approximately four years with respect to one taxing unit and over six
years in the case of the other taxing unit (far longer than the twenty-
seven month delay that, the Fifth Circuit threatened in Law, approached
the maximum delay without constituting an unconstitutional delay).213 In
Balli the property was valued at approximately $530,000, the taxing units'
tax liens totalled approximately $74,000 and the FDIC's lien was for ap-
proximately $197,000.214 The court reasoned that, unlike the facts in Law
(in which the FDIC lien was in excess of the value of the property), sur-
vival of the FDIC liens did not prevent a tax sale because the FDIC's lien
was less than the value of the property.215 Unfortunately, after Law and
Balli, it remains unclear in what circumstances lengthy delays by the
FDIC in consenting to a foreclosure sale by taxing units constitute an
unconstitutional taking.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held in Department of Hous. &
Urban Dev. v. Nueces County Appraisal DiSt.216 that a taxpayer which
owned property on January 1, 1991, but had sold the property before fil-
ing suit to challenge the appraisal review board's valuation of the prop-
erty for the 1991 tax year had standing to challenge the appraisal review
board's order.217 Section 42.01 of the Tax Code 218 provides that a "prop-
erty owner" is entitled to appeal the appraisal review board's order deter-
mining protest. The appraisal district asserted that, at the time of the
filing of the petition, the taxpayer was not the "property owner."
Although the taxpayer was not technically the owner of the property
when suit was filed, the Tax Code provides that owners of property on
January 1 of each year are personally liable for taxes for such year even if
the property is later conveyed.219 In rejecting the appraisal district's ar-
gument, the court reasoned that the Texas Legislature intended for "the
[T]ax [Clode to allow taxpayers a regular, systematic way to protest prop-
erty appraisals," and that the Texas Legislature did not intend that a tax-
payer who transfers the property after January 1 be entitled to only part
of the review process (i.e., administrative appeals only). 220
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. In yet another case during the Survey period addressing tax liens, the Dallas
Court of Appeals in City of Dallas v. Cornerstone Bank, N.A., 879 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) held that the property tax lien existing under TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 32.01 (Vernon 1992) (amended 1993) applied to after-acquired inventory. Interest-
ingly, § 32.01(b) was added in 1993 to provide expressly that the tax lien applies to after-
acquired inventory.
216. 875 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) [hereinafter HUD].
217. Id. at 380.
218. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Vernon 1992).
219. Id. § 32.07(c).
220. HUD, 875 S.W.2d at 380. If a property owner on January 1 who later sells the
property were not allowed to contest in court the property's value for the year in which the
owner was liable for the property taxes, an appraisal review board's decision concerning
the property's value would effectively be a final, non-appealable decision.
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IV. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, PROCEDURE, LIENS,
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
In one of the most interesting cases of the year, R Communications Inc.
v. Sharp,221 the Texas Supreme Court held that a taxpayer's right to chal-
lenge judicially a sales tax deficiency could not be conditioned on pay-
ment of the tax at issue. To do so, the court held, violates the open courts
policy. R Communications sought relief from a sales tax assessment by
seeking judicial review; the district court had dismissed the taxpayer's suit
for lack of jurisdiction and the court of appeals had affirmed. 222 The
Supreme Court of Texas, in a unanimous decision, reversed the lower
court decision.
R Communications asserted that several provisions of the Tax Code
violate the equal protection, open courts and due course of law provisions
of the Texas Constitution: section 112.108223 which denies a taxpayer any
form of declaratory relief; section 112.051,224 which conditions the right
to file suit attacking the tax's validity or its assessment or collection upon
prior payment of the taxes; section 112.101,225 which precludes injunctive
relief without prior tax payment or the posting of a bond, approved by
both the court and the attorney general, equal to twice the amount of
estimated tax liability; and section 111.022,226 which authorizes summary
collection procedures without the state filing suit.2 27 R Communications
also alleged these provisions violated due process and equal protection
under the United States Constitution.
The supreme court focused on the taxpayer's assertion that the Tax
Code violated the fundamental requirement that all courts shall be open,
and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.228 In determining
the legislature's purpose in enacting the law, the court emphasized that
until 1989 taxpayers were able to seek a declaratory judgment of no tax
liability without satisfying the prepayment provisions of section 112.051.
According to the court, the right to declaratory judgment was terminated
by the 1989 enactment of section 112.108, whose purpose, according to
the court, was to ensure prompt payment of taxes by insurance compa-
nies. 229 Viewing R Communications as without adequate recourse to the
courts, the supreme court held section 112.108 "unconstitutional and
221. 875 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994). Interestingly, taxpayer's attorney did not appear for
supreme court argument, and the court's decision underscores its commitment to taxpay-
ers' right to open courts.
222. No. 91-4893 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., July 8, 1991), aff'd, 839 S.W.2d
947 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1992), rev'd 875 S.W.2d 314.
223. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.108 (Vernon 1992).
224. Id. § 112.051.
225. Id. § 112.011.
226. Id. § 111.022.
227. R Communications, 875 S.W.2d at 314-15.
228. Id. at 315 (citing TEx. CONsT. art. I, § 13).
229. Id. at 316.
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void" in that it precludes a taxpayer from obtaining judicial review of its
tax liability by means of a declaratory action. 230
Subsequent to R Communications, the comptroller has an incentive to
narrow the court's holding; unless the comptroller can convince the
courts to limit the scope of this case, taxpayers will often be able to delay
tax payment for years by contesting their taxes. (The court noted that the
R Communications case took over six years to reach the Texas Supreme
Court). 231 Accordingly, comptroller representatives quickly focused on
the fact that R Communications was in dire financial straits, and took the
position that R Communications was intended to reach only such
taxpayers.
It took only a short time, in fact, for taxpayers to rely on R Communi-
cations to file prepayment court cases on a variety of taxes and to petition
for refunds of amounts already paid. For example, in Weck v. Sharp2 32
the taxpayer argued that he should be permitted to seek a declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act.233
The taxpayer in Weck had purchased over 800 pounds of marijuana from
undercover agents, and was assessed for over a million dollars for failure
to pay taxes due under the Controlled Substance Act.234 Noting that it
had struck section 112.108 of the Tax Code 235 insofar as it would prevent
taxpayers from seeking declaratory judgment on tax cases,236 the court
concluded that the invalidation of section 112.108 provided the trial court
with jurisdiction, and remanded the case for further proceedings.237
Property tax suits filed without payment also are pending, creating con-
cerns that school funding and budgets may be adversely affected if the
court's holding in R Communications is consistently applied.
Other taxpayers with financial difficulties were the subject of litigation
addressing lien priorities. The Fifth Circuit addressed the priority of a
state fuel tax lien relative to a federal excise tax lien in Western Nat'l
Bank v. United States.238 The controversy centered on competing claims
of the United States and the State of Texas with respect to a bank account
that held payments from the taxpayer's customers. The bank account was
also the subject of a lockbox arrangement with a secured party. One ar-
gument advanced by the state was that its claim was entitled to superpri-
ority status under section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code239 which
provides that a lien is not valid against the purchaser of a security who
lacked actual knowledge of the lien at the time of purchase. Though the
230. Id. at 318.
231. Id at 317.
232. 884 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
233. See TEX. TAX CODE §§ 159.001 - .301 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
234. The court offers no comment as to whether anyone actually expects dealers in
illegal taxes to pay the tax at issue.
235. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.108 (Vernon 1992).
236. Weck, 884 S.W.2d at 154.
237. Id.
238. 8 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 1993).
239. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
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state contended it qualified as a purchaser of money, which is a security,
the court disagreed and found that to qualify as a purchaser there must be
an exchange of consideration and there is no such exchange in the collec-
tion of revenue. 240 The court further relied upon the fact that Congress
enacted a superpriority for state real property tax and special assessment
liens but has not granted such status to state fuel or sales taxes. 241 The
court concluded that the priority of competing state and federal tax
claims, when section 6323 is not applicable, is determined by the rule that
the first in time is the first in right; and in this case the federal excise tax
lien was entitled to priority because the IRS assessed the excise taxes
against the taxpayer prior to the time Texas' equitable interest arose.242
Amsco Steel Company v. Sharp243 held against the comptroller on an
important procedural issue.244 The comptroller had asserted that the is-
suance of a refund check is an administrative decision, and that taxpayers
who receive refund checks and do not file motions for new hearings can
therefore be precluded from subsequently raising objections or filing new
refund claims, on the ground that an administrative decision on the
franchise tax year at issue had already become final.245 The court held to
the contrary, concluding that issuing a refund check under the law in ef-
fect at the time did not constitute a final decision under the comptroller's
rules or under the Texas Administrative Procedures and Texas Register
Act.
Another interesting case affecting the statute of limitations is Borden,
Inc. v. Sharp.246 Borden relied on the technically correct reading of two
statutes (sections 111.205(4)247 and 111.107 of the Tax Code24 8 ) to con-
clude that a taxpayer who has timely filed a tax refund has effectively
tolled the statute of limitations indefinitely. The comptroller argues that
this reading of the statute is inconsistent with legislative intent and with
long-standing comptroller practice.
240. Western Nat'l Bank, 8 F.3d at 255.
241. Id See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323(b)(6) (West Supp. 1994).
242. The state argued that the funds in the account were held in trust for the state by
the secured party pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon 1992), which re-
quires collectors of fuel taxes to hold the funds in trust for the state, and therefore the IRS
lien could not attach to the funds in the account which were collected to pay the fuel taxes.
Western Nat'l Bank, 8 F.3d at 255.
243. No. 91-5685 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Nov. 1993), appeal docketed, No.
3-94-00169-CV (Tex. App.-Austin).
244. The case also held against the comptroller on the franchise tax issue involved, by
agreeing with the taxpayer that, since it had a net operating loss for federal income tax
purposes, it could recover the claimed refund without reduction for tax effecting.
245. This comptroller policy illustrates the maxim that hard facts make bad law; the
comptroller's policy was designed with the understandable goals of allowing the comptrol-
ler to issue refund checks to taxpayers efficiently in the aftermath of Bullock v. Sage En-
ergy Co., 728 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and to bring closure
to taxpayer refund claims for the years at issue; nonetheless, the policy effectively deprived
taxpayers of the right to administrative hearings on contested issues.
246. No. 92-08383 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 1993), appeal docketed,
No. 3-94-00074-CV (Tex. App.-Austin).
247. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.205(4) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
248. Id. § 111.107.
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The attorney general and comptroller also continued their efforts to
impose successor liability on Texas taxpayers. The comptroller held, for
example, that a taxpayer who purchased a restaurant business was liable
for the taxes of the restaurant seller 249 under section 111.020 of the Tax
Code.250 In a few cases, however, taxpayers prevailed. In one hearing,
for example, the taxpayer succeeded in showing the comptroller that she
should not be liable as a successor under the successor liability rules,
since her acquisition of the "business" was more the nature of an acquisi-
tion of a tradename than the acquisition of a continuing business. 251 As
the comptroller more aggressively pursues successors, it becomes more
important for sellers to consider requesting tax clearance certificates, set-
ting up escrows, or otherwise protecting themselves from unanticipated
tax liability.
Serna v. State252 and Jonnet v. State253 further illustrate the potential for
personal liability for officers of corporations that have failed to pay
franchise taxes. These two cases show the significance of the risk to
which officers of such corporations are exposed. In Serna the defendant
officers had argued that an officer could not be held liable unless an of-
ficer or employee of the corporation took some specific action to create a
debt.254 Thus, Serna asserted, he could not be held liable for the corpora-
tion's failure to plug abandoned oil wells after the corporation had for-
feited its charter since, according to Serna, the obligation to plug the
wells arose from action by the Railroad Commission rather than action
by the corporation's agents.255 The court disagreed, holding that "[t]he
Tax Code no longer requires that debts be knowingly and consensually
created for an officer to be held liable. '256 Jonnet,2 57 decided the same
day although by a different judge, reached a similar result.258
249. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,120 (Jan. 3, 1994).
250. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.020 (Vernon 1992).
251. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,262 (Feb. 2, 1994). See also Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,120 (Jan. 3, 1994) (taxpayer not liable as a successor).
252. 877 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
253. 877 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
254. 877 S.W.2d at 518.
255. Id.
256. Id., relying on TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (Vernon 1992) and noting that
Sema had failed to raise the affirmative defense, available under id. § 171.255(c), that the
debt was incurred over his objection or without his knowledge and that he could not have
gained the knowledge through reasonable diligence. Serna, 877 S.W.2d at 519. The court
further provided guidance on the circumstances in which certain debts which relate back to
periods before forfeiture do not give rise to officer liability. Note, however, that Texas law
is not entirely consistent on this second issue.
257. 877 S.W.2d 520.
258. Both cases were decided June 8, 1994, Jonnet by Justice Kidd and Sema by Justice
Bea Ann Smith. The Jonnet panel also issued concurring and dissenting opinions that dis-
cuss the issues at some length. See also Cain v. State, 882 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Austin
1994, no writ). In El T. Mexican Restaurants, Inc. v. Bacon, No. 01-92-00605-CV, 1995
WL 2622 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Jan. 5, 1995, n.w.h.), issued shortly after the
close of the survey period, the court concluded that a sole shareholder of a corporation
that had had its charter forfeited for failure to pay franchise taxes, but that had not been
dissolved, was not able to bring suit individually as a successor in interest to the corpora-
tion. The court recognized that the shareholder was holder of the beneficial title to the
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Several administrative decisions also focus on officer and director lia-
bility. One decision259 addressed petitioner's contention that he was not
an officer and director of the corporation. The comptroller concluded
that one of the individuals was not a corporate officer, but that two who
were officers were properly assessed for sales tax due after the date when
the initial franchise tax report was due, but not filed. 260
Refund claim assignments continue to be troublesome, particularly
since the comptroller has taken the position that a taxpayer who has paid
tax to a vendor may not file a claim for refund without an assignment of
refund claim from the vendor.261 In other procedural matters that are
more taxpayer-favorable, the comptroller confirmed that the state has the
burden of proving that services are taxable,262 and agreed that an audi-
corporation's assets and was entitled to prosecute actions necessary to protect his rights;
nonetheless, the court held that the shareholder could not recover individually on the cor-
poration's claims or, since the corporation had not dissolved, as a successor in interest.
259. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,732 (Jan. 31, 1994).
260. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 29,685 (Jan. 24, 1994) in which the
comptroller asserted that officers of corporations should be held liable for taxes collected,
but not remitted, relying on such TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (1992) (Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,732 had relied on TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255). In distinguish-
ing Dixon v. State, 808 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (individual
liable), from this administrative hearing, the administrative law judge pointed out that the
facts in the Dixon case quite clearly showed that Dixon had committed the tort of conver-
sion. In properly drawing a distinction between someone who converts funds that belong
to the state and someone who is serving as an officer of a corporation, this decision may be
useful in determining the circumstances in which the state's auditors will attempt to collect
tax from officers of the corporation.
261. See TAX PoLIcY NEWS, July 1994, at 2-3. Note also that in several cases, a tax-
payer who paid tax to vendors has filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid only to discover
that the statute of limitations has expired for the vendor's claims for refund; in these cases,
the comptroller has denied the taxpayer's claim on the ground that the vendor had no valid
claim to assign, and that neither the taxpayer nor the vendor is entitled to a refund of the
overpaid taxes.
262. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,461 (Jan. 7, 1994), was decided on the
basis of the failure of the tax division to carry its burden of proof that the services at issue
were subject to tax. The issue was whether grease trap cleaning services for fast food
restaurants was non-taxable maintenance to real property or taxable repairs to real prop-
erty. The administrative law judge analyzed the burden of proving a service is taxable:
[Tihe legislature of the State of Texas has only elected to tax a few, enumer-
ated services as opposed to all services. Thus, it is the burden of the Tax
Division not merely to prove, prima facie, that it was a service that was
purchased/sold tax-free; the Tax Division must show, prima facie, that it was
a taxable service as enumerated in Section 151.0101 and as defined elsewhere
in the Tax Code and by valid Comptroller's rule that was purchased/sold tax-
free,
The decision holds that once the tax division proves a service is subject to tax, the burden
shifts to the taxpayer to prove "either by a preponderance of the evidence that the Tax
Division is wrong ... or by clear and convincing evidence that even though the work
constituted a taxable service it was exempt from taxation." See also Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,660 (Mar. 22, 1994) (tax division failed to meet burden of establish-
ing a taxable service); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,245 (June 16, 1994) which
focused on work provided by an engineering company that had elements of both non-
taxable maintenance/repair and taxable repair or restoration. The taxpayer argued that
since some of the services at issue were taxable, the tax division had the burden of proving
that the other services were taxable; the judge agreed with the tax division that the tax-
payer must prove the exclusion from taxation.
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tor's samples can be used to project not only tax deficiencies but also tax
credits.263
Although the 1995 legislative session will likely not effect major
changes to Texas tax law, judicial and administrative interpretations -
from Texas and other jurisdictions - will continue to refine (and perhaps
expand) the scope of Texas taxes.
263. In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Sharp, No. 91-2823 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County,
Tex., Apr. 12, 1994), the comptroller agreed that Texas Instruments could rely on the sam-
pling projection to determine refunds to which it is entitled. (The comptroller had origi-
nally taken the position that refunds would be allowed only for transactions with respect to
which Texas Instruments secured a vendor assignment). The comptroller has been working
on guidelines to implement using sampling for certain refunds, and representatives have
indicated that these guidelines will permit the use of audit-generated samples, but will not
permit claims for refund to rely on a projected sample, although it is unclear that the courts
will permit the comptroller to refuse to accept valid samples in a refund claim context.

